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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellee Hawa Abdi Jama 1 was detained as an illegal
immigrant at a detention center run by Esmor Correctional
1

Appellee has since changed her name to Holi Hashi Egal.
For consistency across the proceedings, we use her original
name here.
4

Services, Inc. (“Esmor”). Jama sued Esmor and certain of its
officers and employees, including facility administrator John
Lima, for violating her rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and on
tort theories. The jury found in favor of Jama on the RFRA
claim, against Esmor and Lima, and in favor of Jama on one
state negligence claim, against Esmor, Lima, and two other
Defendants. The jury awarded $1 in RFRA damages and
$100,000 in tort damages. The District Court awarded Jama an
attorney’s fee against Esmor and Lima after concluding that a
portion of the tort award was “designed as compensation for”
RFRA injuries. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs. Inc., 549 F. Supp.
2d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2008). Esmor and Lima appealed.
Appellants argue that the District Court’s interpretation
of the jury award was erroneous, and assert that no fee may be
awarded because Jama’s success on the fee-eligible RFRA claim
was de minimis, and the pendent state claim cannot be
considered.
Appellants alternatively challenge the
reasonableness of the amount awarded on several grounds. We
agree that the District Court erred in interpreting the jury award,
but do not agree that the Court is precluded from awarding fees
under these circumstances as a matter of law. We will remand
the matter for the District Court to reconsider the fee award
under the legal standards discussed below.

5

I. INTRODUCTION
Ms. Jama, a Somalian immigrant and Muslim, filed a
complaint in 1997, along with 19 other plaintiffs, to redress
allegedly abusive treatment and deplorable conditions at a
private detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey (“the
Facility”). The Facility was operated by Esmor under contract
with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Esmor
was named as a Defendant, as were certain officers and
employees of the company, including the facility administrator
John Lima.2 By the time of the 2007 verdict, Jama was the last
remaining plaintiff whose claims had not settled. At trial, she
presented evidence of general indignities suffered in the Facility,
as well as evidence specifically relating to restrictions on her
practice of religion. This latter category included evidence that
her attempts to pray were disrupted by guards, that she was
picked up from the floor while praying and thrown onto her bed,
that her Koran was thrown in the garbage, that she was
subjected to unnecessary strip searches, that she was exposed
naked in common view, that she was forced to eat pork, and that

2

The remaining Defendants subject to claims that reached the
jury were James Slattery, Richard Staley (deceased), and Diane
McClure. None of these individuals, nor the Estate of Richard
Staley, is a party to this appeal.
6

the only cleric available was a priest who urged her to pray to
Jesus.3
The District Court submitted four claims to the jury,
including a claim that Defendants substantially burdened Jama’s
ability to practice her religion in violation of RFRA,4 and a
claim under state law that certain Defendants, including Esmor
and Lima, were negligent in hiring, training, supervising, and/or
retaining guards at the facility.5 On the RFRA claim, the Court
instructed the jury that Jama had to prove either that the officials
“inflicted or constrained conduct or expressions that manifested
some central tenet” of her beliefs, that their acts or omissions

3

As we do not have the complete trial record before us, we
accept the District Court’s characterization of the evidence for
the limited purpose of providing background. See Jama, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 607.
4

RFRA provides that a government “shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government
“demonstrates that application of the burden . . . is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. A person who
is burdened in violation of RFRA has a private right of action.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). Although RFRA is unconstitutional
as applied to state governments, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997), federal claims remain viable, Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006).
5

The remaining two claims, not directly at issue here, alleged
liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and
negligent hiring of specified individuals under state law.
7

“meaningfully curtailed” her “ability to express adherence to her
faith,” or that the officials denied her a “reasonable opportunity
to engage in those activities that are fundamental to her
religion.” (JA 194-95.) To succeed specifically against
Defendant Esmor, the Court instructed that the violations had to
be caused by “an official policy or custom” or “from the actions
of an official with final policy-making authority.” (JA 196.)
For negligent hiring/training/supervision/retention, the
Court instructed that, under New Jersey law, Jama must prove
that one or more of the enumerated Defendants, including
Esmor and Lima, were negligent, and that their negligence
proximately caused Jama injury. Negligent acts or omissions
within the purview of the claim included failures by the
Defendants to exercise reasonable care in investigating the
guards’ conduct, and failures to exercise reasonable care in
training and supervising the guards to prevent foreseeable harm
to the inmates.
As for damages, if any, the jury was instructed to award
“an amount that will fairly compensate her for any injury she
actually sustained as a result of a defendant’s conduct.”
(JA 207.) The Court explained that Jama claimed as damages
“[p]hysical harm . . . during and after the events at issue,
physical pain, disability, disfigurement, or discomfort, [and]
emotional or mental harm . . . during and after the events at
issue, including fear, humiliation, and mental anguish . . . .”
(JA 208-09.) The Court stated that the jury “must not award
compensatory damages more than once for the same injury” and
that it “must not award her any individual compensatory
damages on each claim if the two claims resulted in the same
injuries.” (JA 209.) Further, “if different injuries are
8

attributable to the separate claims, then you must compensat[e]
Miss Jama for all of her injuries.” (Id.) The Court also
instructed that, “If you return a verdict for Miss Jama on the . .
. RFRA claim[], but Miss Jama has failed to prove
compensatory damages, then you must award nominal damages
of one dollar. A person whose federal rights were violated is
entitled to a recognition of that violation, even if she suffered no
actual injury.” (JA 210.)
The jury found that Jama proved her RFRA claim against
both Esmor and John Lima, but awarded only $1 on the claim.
It indicated on the questionnaire that no RFRA damages were
included in damages awarded on any other claim. The jury also
found that Jama proved negligent hiring, training, supervision,
and/or retention against Esmor, Lima, and two other Defendants,
and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages on the claim.6
The jury found for Defendants on the two other claims.
Jama moved for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1988. In ascertaining the degree of Jama’s success
under § 1988, the District Court reasoned that the jury “was not
in a position to clarify whether it had concluded that Jama had
simply not proven any compensable [RFRA] injury . . . , or
6

Because the jury awarded compensatory damages on what
may be termed a negligent oversight claim, the jury essentially
had to find that those guards who were negligently hired,
trained, supervised and/or retained engaged in liability-creating
conduct. In such cases, a plaintiff must prove that the
negligently hired, trained, supervised and/or retained employee’s
“incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics
proximately caused the injury.” Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d
508, 516 (N.J. 1982).
9

whether the result reflected the jury’s inability to distinguish
between those and other injuries,” and that the jury may have
“bundle[d] all of Jama’s injuries into one substantial award
under Jama’s Negligence Claims.” Jama, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
606. The Court stated that, based on its assessment of the
evidence, “between 33% and 50% of the jury’s Negligence
Claims award of $100,000 was designed as compensation for
Jama’s RFRA-related injuries.” Id. at 607. The Court
calculated a lodestar of $642,398.57 based entirely on counsels’
work on the RFRA claim, and awarded the entire amount
against Esmor and Lima, the two Defendants found liable under
RFRA. Id. at 613. Esmor and Lima appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the award of a
statutory attorney’s fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, once the award
is reduced to a definite amount. Interfaith Comty. Org. v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 701 (3d Cir. 2005). We
review the reasonableness of a fee award for abuse of discretion,
but our review of the legal standard applied in calculating a fee
is plenary. Evans v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 273
F.3d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 2001). Plenary review also extends to a
district court’s interpretation of a jury’s answers to
interrogatories. See Failla v. Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 153
(3d Cir. 1998). A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations omitted).

10

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that, “In any action or
proceeding to enforce [certain federal statutes including RFRA],
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added). Appellants
concede that, the jury having awarded nominal damages to Jama
on her fee-eligible RFRA claim, Jama was the prevailing party
for the purposes of § 1988. However, Appellants argue that the
District Court erred in recharacterizing the jury verdict, and that
no fee award can be reasonable as a matter of law because
Jama’s success on the fee-eligible federal claim was de minimis
and the pendent state claim cannot be considered.
A. Interpretation of the Jury Verdict
We agree with Appellants that the District Court erred in
attributing a portion of Jama’s tort award to her RFRA claim.
The jury was instructed that “[n]ominal damages of one dollar
are designed to acknowledge the deprivation of a federal right,
even where no . . . injury occurred. However, if you find actual
injury, you must award compensatory damages as I instructed
you, rather than nominal damages.” (JA 210.) The jury plainly
indicated on its questionnaire that $1 in damages was awarded
on the RFRA claim, and that no RFRA damages were included
in the award on any other claim. A court generally “must
assume that the jury understood and followed the court’s
instructions.” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 383
(3d Cir. 2002). We find no inconsistencies in the jury’s answers
to interrogatories that might have required the District Court to
exercise its limited authority to mold the answers to achieve
consistency. See McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896
F.2d 750, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1990). The District Court was thus
11

required to presume that the jury determined that no actual
injury was sustained as a result of the RFRA violation, and
could not conclude that any portion of the $100,000 in
compensatory damages was awarded to compensate for a RFRA
violation.7
We accordingly conclude that the District Court’s
assessment of the evidence was based on an improper
interpretation of the interrogatories and verdict sheet, and we
cannot affirm the resulting order awarding an attorney’s fee.
B. Impact of Farrar v. Hobby
Our conclusion that the District Court erred does not end
our inquiry. Appellants argue that, under Farrar v. Hobby, 506
U.S. 103 (1992), no fee may be awarded as a matter of law
because Jama was only awarded nominal damages on her feeeligible RFRA claim. Farrar is plainly distinguishable because
Jama received a substantial award on the litigation as a whole,
whereas the plaintiffs in Farrar received only a nominal award

7

In light of the nature of the negligence claim on which Jama
prevailed (negligent oversight), and the District Court’s
familiarity with the evidence, it is understandable that the Court
could surmise that negligently hired, trained, supervised, and/or
retained guards caused both compensable RFRA and tort
injuries. Perhaps there was a shortcoming in the unchallenged
special verdict sheet in that the jury was not required to specify
the liability-creating conduct of the guards. However, the jury
was instructed to determine damages according to the claims for
relief, and the District Court did not have the prerogative of
reallocating compensatory damages awarded solely on the
negligent oversight claim.
12

of $1 in total. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 107. Yet even if we were to
ignore the substantial award on Jama’s pendent state claim, we
do not agree with Appellants that Farrar would conclusively
prohibit the award of a fee on Jama’s RFRA claim.
In Farrar, state officials closed a school for troubled
teens and secured an indictment against the owner. Farrar, 506
U.S. at 105. The owner sued, alleging deprivations of liberty
and property without due process. Id. at 106. He, and his
administrators after his death, sought only monetary relief in the
form of $17 million in damages. Id. The jury found, through
special interrogatories, that just one of the six defendants had
deprived Farrar of a civil right. However, the jury expressly
found that the defendant’s conduct did not proximately cause
Farrar’s asserted damages. Id. The district court ultimately
awarded nominal damages of $1 and attorney’s fees. Id. A
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the award of fees,
holding that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties, and were
thus ineligible for fees under § 1988. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision, but on
different grounds. The Court held that a plaintiff who is
awarded nominal damages is a prevailing party for the purposes
of § 1988. Id. at 114. However, the Court also stated that,
“Although the ‘technical’ nature of a nominal damages award or
any other judgment does not affect the prevailing party inquiry,
it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988.” Id.
In determining the reasonableness of fees under § 1988, the
Court continued, “‘the most critical factor . . . is the degree of
success obtained.’” Id. at114 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). Accordingly, when a plaintiff seeking
compensatory damages “recovers only nominal damages
13

because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim
for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
all.” Id. at 115 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Justice O’Connor joined the other four justices in the
majority without reservation, but she filed a concurring opinion
that further elaborated on the degree of success inquiry. While
she acknowledged that the disparity between the damages
sought and awarded was important in determining the degree of
success, she stated that this “is not the only consideration.” Id.
at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She asserted that “an award
of nominal damages can represent a victory in the sense of
vindicating rights even though no actual damages are proved.”
Id. Justice O’Connor stated that “courts also must look to other
factors” in assessing success, including “the significance of the
legal issue” decided, and whether the decision “accomplished
some public goal.” Id. at 121-22. Upon considering all of these
“relevant indicia of success,” Justice O’Connor concluded that
Farrar’s victory was de minimis. Id. at 122.
Several courts of appeals, relying on Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence, have permitted fee awards despite the award of
only nominal damages. In Mercer v. Duke University, 401 F.3d
199 (4th Cir. 2005), a female college football player brought a
Title IX discrimination claim against a university after she had
been cut from the football team. Id. at 201. Although the
plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an award of $350,000 in
attorney fees despite the de minimis compensatory relief. Id. at
211. The court concluded that a fee award was within the
district court’s discretion because the legal issue on which the
plaintiff prevailed was significant and the litigation served a
14

public purpose. Id. at 206-09.
In Diaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119
(1st Cir. 2004), terminated municipal employees sued city
officials, alleging that their terminations were motivated by the
employees’ political affiliations. Id. at 121. The plaintiffs
brought First Amendment and due process claims. Id. The jury
found for the defendants on the First Amendment claims and
awarded only nominal damages on the due process claim. Id. at
122. The district court awarded an attorney’s fee, and the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals
distinguished the facts of the case at bar from those in Farrar by
applying Justice O’Connor’s factors:
Here, although plaintiffs’ victory was de minimis
as to the extent of relief, the district court
appropriately exercised its discretion to award
fees, as the determination that the municipality
violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights
represented a significant legal conclusion serving
an important public purpose.
Id. at 125. Other courts of appeals have also adopted Justice
O’Connor’s factors for resolving the degree of success inquiry.
See Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2005);
Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1997);
Johnson v. Lafayette Fire Fighters Ass’n Local 472, 51 F.3d
726, 731 (7th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 423-24
(8th Cir. 1994).
In contrast, we find no case in which a court of appeals
has interpreted Farrar to require the automatic denial of fees
15

that Appellants seek when only nominal damages are awarded.
We agree with our sister courts of appeals that a district court
determining the degree of a plaintiff’s success should consider
not only the difference between the relief sought and achieved,
but also the significance of the legal issue decided and whether
the litigation served a public purpose.8
Yet our interpretation of Farrar only takes us part way in
resolving this appeal. While Jama might be entitled to at least
a partial fee award solely on the basis of her RFRA claim, Jama
received more than mere nominal damages as a result of her
litigation. The substantial award on her pendent state claim
distinguishes her from the plaintiffs in Farrar, Mercer, and
Diaz-Rivera, who received only nominal damages in total. We

8

In adopting these considerations, we do not, as Judge Garth
suggests, set aside the majority opinion in Farrar, nor do we
accord Justice O’Connor’s concurrence controlling weight.
While the majority in Farrar stated that a reasonable fee is
usually no fee when a plaintiff receives only nominal damages,
the case involved extreme facts and the majority provided no
guidance for distinguishing the usual from the unusual case.
Justice O’Connor set forth a practical method for resolving such
questions that other courts of appeals have found helpful. Also,
we do not agree with Judge Garth that a nominal award on a
RFRA claim necessarily amounts to a technical and de minimis
victory. The jury found that Esmor and Lima violated Jama’s
rights by substantially burdening her exercise of religion. The
impact of such a violation on a victim may be uniquely difficult
to express in monetary terms, but the significance of the right
vindicated and the purpose served by the litigation cannot be
overlooked and, especially in the prison setting, should not be
diminished.
16

must therefore decide whether Jama’s success on her state law
claim may independently inform the degree of her success under
§ 1988.
C. Pendent State Claim
We are surprised to find that the impact of success on
state claims as related to the award of fees under § 1988 has not
been squarely addressed by this Court, and has been sparsely
litigated elsewhere. Appellants argue that pendent state law
claims may only be considered in the success inquiry if the legal
standards and operative facts for the state and federal feeeligible claims are identical.9 However, the cases relied on by
Appellants do not really support this restrictive rule because they
either permitted fee awards or were materially distinguishable.10
9

Appellants also assert another “exception” for allowing the
consideration of state claims by pointing to cases where feeeligible claims were not decided for prudential reasons, but fees
were permitted on the basis of other successful claims. Since it
is undisputed that Jama prevailed on her fee-eligible RFRA
claim, these cases are all distinguishable and of little assistance.

10

For instance, Appellants cite Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122
(1980), but the language cited dealt with an Eleventh
Amendment issue that is irrelevant here. Id. at 132. Moreover,
Maher cannot support a restrictive rule on fee awards because
the Court interpreted § 1988 expansively, ruling that fee awards
are permissible on non-constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. at 128. Appellants also cite to Luria Brothers & Co.
v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982), a case in which attorney’s
fees were denied, but this case is plainly distinguishable because
the plaintiff in Luria, unlike Jama, did not prevail on a
17

Appellants point to no case where a court denied fees to a
plaintiff who had prevailed on a qualifying federal claim and
also received a substantial award on a state law claim.
Jama contends that the express language of § 1988(b)
authorizes the consideration of pendent state claims in awarding
fees when a plaintiff prevails on a fee-eligible claim. The
statute does not refer to “claims,” but instead provides that fees
may be awarded, “In any action or proceeding to enforce”
various provisions including RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(emphasis added). Under the plain text of the statute, Jama
asserts, it is within a district court’s discretion to consider the
success of the action or proceeding as a whole, to include
success on pendent state law claims.

fee-eligible federal claim. Id. at 358. Other cases asserted by
Appellants are Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n,
178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Passantino v. Johnson &
Johnson Consumer Products, Inc., 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000).
Martini involved a determination as to whether a federal
damages cap should apply where the state and local standards
instructed to the jury were identical. 178 F.3d at 1349-50. This
case is of little help because no fee award was at issue. In
Passantino, a plaintiff prevailed on her federal Title VII
retaliation claims, but did not prevail on her federal Title VII
discrimination claims. Passantino, 212 F.3d at 517-18. In short
shrift, the court of appeals rejected defendant’s argument that
the attorney fee should have been reduced for limited success,
noting that the claims were “inextricably intertwined.” Id. at
518. No state claim was involved, and nothing suggests that the
court would have required the claims to be inextricably
intertwined in order to conclude that the fee award was within
the district court’s discretion.
18

We agree that the language of § 1988(b) seems to be
sufficiently broad to endorse the inclusion of state claims in the
consideration of overall success. However, we do not find
precedent on point that clearly adopts this interpretation as
conclusive. Jama relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983), in which plaintiffs obtained mixed results in a case
involving multiple federal claims. There, the Supreme Court
instructed the district court to consider whether the unsuccessful
and successful claims shared a common core of facts or were
based on related legal theories, in order to inform the “results
obtained” inquiry. Id. at 434, 437. While Hensley provides the
standard for determining whether claims are related under
§ 1988, the case did not specifically involve pendent state
claims, nor did the clarifying and reaffirming case of Texas State
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent School District, 489
U.S. 782 (1989).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided a
case closer to the one before us in Bridges v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 102 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom., Yourdon,
Inc. v. Bridges, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997). The plaintiffs in Bridges
alleged that they were sexually harassed by their employer in
violation of Title VII and an analogous New York antidiscrimination statute. Id. at 57. The district court held a jury
trial on the state claims and a concurrent bench trial on the Title
VII claims. Id. The jury found that the defendants violated the
state law and awarded plaintiffs substantial amounts for back
pay and compensatory damages. Id. The court made parallel
findings under Title VII, but awarded no monetary relief on the
federal claims, specifically in order to avoid double recovery.
Id. at 58. The district court awarded fees to the plaintiffs

19

without making any reduction for lack of success on the federal
claim. Id.
The defendants argued on appeal that the plaintiffs were
ineligible for attorney’s fees because there was no award on the
fee-eligible claim, and, alternatively, that the award should have
been reduced due to the plaintiffs’ limited success. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed on both
points in a brief opinion. The court concluded that the plaintiffs
prevailed on the fee-eligible claim, and distinguished Farrar
because Farrar did not involve “a plaintiff who had achieved
substantial success - and a large monetary award - on pendent
state-law claims.” Id. at 59. The court affirmed the district
court’s judgment of award without any reduction. Id. at 60.
Although Bridges helps Jama, the case is distinguishable
because the state and federal claims at bar were brought under
parallel employment discrimination statutes. Here, the elements
of Jama’s state negligence and federal RFRA claims are not so
closely aligned. Moreover, the court in Bridges specifically
declined to award damages on the federal claim in order to avoid
double recovery, suggesting that the plaintiffs would have
recovered on the federal claim but for the jury award on the state
claim.11 Yet nothing in Bridges can be read to require identical

11

The jury here was instructed not to compensate more than
once for the same injury. However, the interrogatory form
asked for the amount of damages attributable to each claim, and
asked whether RFRA damages were included in any award on
another claim. The jury indicated that only $1 was awarded on
the RFRA claim, and that no RFRA damages were included in
an award on any other claim. We thus cannot conclude that the
20

or nearly identical state and federal claims in order for the state
claim to be considered as part of the degree of success inquiry.
The Bridges panel cited approvingly to an earlier case in
the Second Circuit that aligns more closely with the instant
circumstances. In Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.
1981), the plaintiff was injured in a scuffle with police officers.
Id. at 81. Police officials thereafter secured a warrant for her
arrest, and charged her with interfering with a police officer and
disturbing the peace. Id. The charges were subsequently
dismissed. Id. The plaintiff brought a suit against several
officers and supervisors for compensatory and punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and on pendent state law theories.
After a trial, the jury found for the plaintiff against one
defendant on a constitutional excessive force claim and a
pendent state assault claim. The jury awarded $1 and $1,320 on
these claims, respectively. The jury also found for the plaintiff
against one other defendant on a constitutional claim relating to
her arrest, and a claim for false arrest under state law. The jury
awarded $1 in total for both of these claims. Id.
The district court denied fees under § 1988, and the
plaintiff appealed.
Defendants argued that fees were
inappropriate since, inter alia, the only significant damages were
awarded on the pendent state assault claim. Id. at 84. The court
of appeals reversed for two reasons. First, the court quoted
Maher v. Gagne, and stated that “attorney’s fees are available in
cases ‘in which the plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory,
non-civil rights claim pendent to a substantial constitutional

jury awarded nominal damages on the RFRA claim merely to
avoid double recovery.
21

claim.’” 12 Id. (quoting Maher, 448 U.S. at 132). The court thus
extended Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding pendent
federal claims to pendent state claims. The court also concluded
that, leaving aside the state law claim, the award of $1 on a feeeligible constitutional claim could alone support the award of
fees. Id. at 84. The court accordingly remanded the matter for
further consideration. Id.
The second reason given in Milwe for permitting fees,
namely consideration of the fee-eligible claim only, should be
read with caution in light of Farrar and our discussion above.
However, Farrar did not involve a pendent state law claim, and
thus has no effect on the first reason for permitting fees in
Milwe. While we recognize that Milwe predates many important
§ 1988 cases, we find no case that contradicts or undermines the
Milwe court’s reasoning with regard to pendent state claims.13

12

Appellants argue that allowing a district court to consider
state common law claims would violate Maher’s “wholly
statutory” language. We are not persuaded. In Maher, the
Supreme Court was distinguishing between clearly fee-eligible
constitutional civil rights claims and statutory Social Security
claims under § 1983. The “wholly statutory” language marked
an expansion of § 1988 to include non-constitutional claims.
We agree with the District Court that the wholly statutory
distinction has no bearing on this case.
13

We also note that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
treated Milwe approvingly in Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d 287,
291 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Milwe and determining that an award
on a pendent state negligence claim may inform the success
inquiry where the plaintiff prevailed with a lesser award on a
fee-eligible federal claim), overruled on other grounds by Crowe
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Based on these considerations, we cannot agree with Appellants
that a district court may only consider an award on a pendent
state claim if the operative facts or legal standards of the state
and federal claims are identical.
While identity between the claims is not required, the
state and federal claims must certainly bear some relation in
order for the state claim to be considered under § 1988.
Although Hensley did not address pendent state claims, the case
does provide helpful guidance. In Hensley, the Supreme Court
described how a district court should determine whether
unsuccessful claims are sufficiently related to claims on which
a plaintiff prevailed in order to include work on the unsuccessful
claims in a fee award. The Court instructed that claims that
“involve a common core of facts [or are] based on related legal
theories” are related for these purposes. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
435. The Court further instructed that “[t]here is no precise rule
or formula for making these determinations,” and that the
district court “necessarily has discretion in making this equitable
judgment.” Id. at 436. The Court also noted that “[a] request
for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major
litigation.” Id.
Applying this reasoning here, we conclude that the
Hensley standard should guide a district court’s consideration of
pendent state claims in a litigation where a plaintiff has
prevailed on a fee-eligible federal claim. We will vacate the
award and remand the matter for the District Court to make this
discretionary determination in the first instance. The District
Court should determine whether Jama’s RFRA and pendent

v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2004).
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state negligence claims involved a “common core of facts” or
were based on “related legal theories.” 14 If the claims are
related under this standard, the results on Jama’s tort claims may
inform the degree of Jama’s overall success for the purposes of
§ 1988.15 Whether or not the state and federal claims are
related, the District Court should also consider the extent to
which Jama’s RFRA claim might, even independently, justify a
fee award under the factors articulated by Justice O’Connor in
Farrar. Thus, while the jury’s nominal award must undoubtedly

14

Although we do not have the complete trial record before us,
statements by the District Court suggest that it should not be
difficult to reconsider the relationship between the state and
federal claims under the instant standard. For instance, the
District Court stated in its opinion that “the RFRA-related
conduct was . . . a significant part of Jama’s Negligence
Claims,” suggesting that the Court identified legal and/or factual
relationships between the two claims. Jama, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
606.
15

Judge Garth contends that the jury’s compensatory award on
the negligence claim and mere nominal award on the RFRA
claim conclusively forecloses the existence of a sufficient
relationship between the state and fee-eligible claims, and our
decision therefore intrudes upon the role of the jury. We do not
agree. Hensley makes clear that an attorney’s work on an
unsuccessful claim may be compensated if the claim is factually
or legally related to a claim on which the plaintiff prevailed.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The question of whether particular
claims, successful or otherwise, arise from a common core of
facts does not turn on a jury’s verdict. Moreover, a jury’s
factual findings cannot possibly resolve relationships between
legal theories. Hensley leaves no doubt that such inquiries under
§ 1988 are left to the discretion of district court. Id. at 436.
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color the degree of Jama’s success on her RFRA claim, the
District Court should also consider the significance of the legal
issue on which she prevailed and determine whether her victory
served a public purpose.
D. Reasonableness of the Fee Awarded
Appellants argue in the alternative that, even if a fee
award is permissible in this case, the $642,398.57 amount
awarded by the District Court is unreasonably high. Since we
conclude that the District Court’s degree of success analysis was
predicated on an erroneous interpretation of the jury verdict, we
cannot review the overall figure until the Court has reconsidered
Jama’s success under the standards discussed above. However,
we will address two issues relating to the overall award that are
suitable for review at this time in order to provide guidance on
remand.
Appellants argue that the District Court abused its
discretion by arriving at unreasonable hourly rates. A District
Court’s determination of market billing rates “is a factual
question which is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of
review.” Smith v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223,
225(3d Cir. 1997). In moving for a fee award,
The plaintiff bears the burden of producing
sufficient evidence of what constitutes a
reasonable market rate for the essential character
and complexity of the legal services rendered in
order to make out a prima facie case. Once the
plaintiff has carried this burden, defendant may
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contest that prima facie case only with appropriate
record evidence.
Id. (internal citations omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous
standard, a finding of fact may be reversed on appeal only if it
is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no
rational relationship to the supporting data.” Shire US Inc. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted).
In determining the hourly rates in the instant matter, the
District Court relied on a previous analysis it had made in
connection with a request for discovery sanctions against Esmor.
Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 2007 W.L. 4166016 (D.N.J.
Nov. 20, 2007). Jama’s counsel supported its rates with
affidavits listing similar rates that had been accepted by the
District Court for the District of New Jersey in prior cases. The
District Court accepted counsel’s submitted rates, after making
a reduction in fees from New York market levels to the levels of
the metropolitan Newark market. Id. at *3. The attorney hourly
rates accepted by the District Court for Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP ranged from $600 for a partner to $205 for a first-year
associate, and $400 for Ms. Penny Venetis of the Rutgers
Constitutional Litigation Clinic.
Appellants argue that their own evidence regarding rates,
and rates accepted in other cases, demonstrated that the rates
used by the District Court are unreasonable. While the rates
applied here may have been higher than rates applied in other
cases, we find nothing in the record indicating that the District
Court’s determination was clearly erroneous. Jama’s counsel
submitted affidavits and prior examples of similar rates. The
26

District Court weighed the sophisticated nature of the work
involved, and made a reduction in Debevoise’s rates to bring
them in line with the Newark market. The rates adopted are
neither devoid of a credible evidentiary basis, nor do they lack
a rational relationship to the supporting data, and we will
accordingly not disturb them on appeal.
Finally, Appellants argue that the District Court erred by
including in the award $1,485.70 for expert fees because such
fees are not authorized in RFRA claims. Jama concedes this
point, and disclaims her entitlement to $1,485.70. Thus, the
District Court shall exclude these expert fees from any future
award.
III. CONCLUSION
The District Court’s degree of success inquiry under
§ 1988 was based on an impermissible reconstruction of the jury
verdict, and we will VACATE the resulting order awarding an
attorney’s fee. We will REMAND the matter for the District
Court to reconsider Jama’s motion for an attorney’s fee award
consistent with this Opinion.

GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Let me recount the fundamental issues presented on this
appeal—in effect: “let’s review the bidding.”
1. The complaint filed by Jama sought $250,000 in
statutory damages for violations of the Religious Freedom
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Restoration Act (“RFRA”); it also sought a total of nearly $5
million for all damages including general negligence damages,
punitive damages, and RFRA.
2. RFRA provides that, if a violation is found, not only
may damages be awarded but reasonable attorney’s fees may be
assessed. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
3. After 23 days of trial before a jury which heard
evidence of RFRA violations and tortious conduct by some of
the defendants, the jury was charged specifically by the District
Court as follows:
You must not award compensatory damages more
than once for the same injury. For example, if
Miss Jama prevails on two claims and establishes
a dollar amount for her injuries, you must not
award her any individual compensatory damages
on each claim if the two claims resulted in the
same injuries. Miss Jama is only entitled to be
made whole once, and may not recover more than
she has lost. Of course, if different injuries are
attributable to the separate claims, then you must
compensation [sic] Miss Jama for all of her
injuries. . . .
If you return a verdict for Miss Jama on the
ATCA and the RFRA claims, but Miss Jama has
failed to prove compensatory damages, then you
must award nominal damages of one dollar. . . .
However, if you find actual injury, you must
award compensatory damages as I instructed you,
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rather than nominal damages.
J.A. 209-10.
4. No exceptions were taken to the charge. No additions
were sought by the plaintiffs to the charge. See Farrar v. Cain,
756 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1985), aff’d 506 U.S. 103
(1992) (failure to object to the jury charge and special
interrogatories precludes our review in the absence of plain error
or manifest miscarriage of justice).
5. The evidence before the jury consisted of actions
which violated RFRA, but also consisted of other negligent
tortious actions by the defendants. We note them infra.
6. The jury was asked to answer a series of interrogatory
questions in delivering its verdict.16 The jury complied fully
with the District Court’s instructions and answered the relevant
interrogatories as follows:
1. [not relevant to this appeal]

2. Has Ms. Jama proved by a preponderance of

16

The only other case cited by Jama in which interrogatories
were utilized by the District Court was Farrar itself. However,
the interrogatories in Farrar were not detailed as they were here,
did not involve the distinction between eligible and ineligible
fee statutes, and did not afford the explicit and unequivocal
answers to the interrogatories that the instant verdict provides.
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the evidence her Religious Freedom Restoration
Act claim against Esmor . . . and/or Lima?
Yes17
...
2F. What is the amount of compensatory damages
to which Ms. Jama is entitled on account of her
RFRA claim alone, without considering damages
on account of any other claim on which you found
a Defendant liable?
$1.00

2G. Was the amount of the damages awarded on
the RFRA claim included in the amount of
damages awarded on any other claim, and, if so,
which claims?
...
Negligence Claim #1:

No 18

17

The jury found that the RFRA claim was not proved against
Defendants Slattery, Staley, and McClure.
18

“Yes” was the first answer given by the jury. That answer
was crossed out and “No” was entered in its place.
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...
2H. Is Ms. Jama entitled to punitive damages
against any Defendant found liable on her RFRA
claim?
No
...
3F. What is the amount of the compensatory
damages to which Ms. Jama is entitled on account
of her negligence #1 claim?
$100,000
J.A. 240-43.
7. No exceptions or objections were taken to the form or
to the content of the interrogatories, nor were additions sought
to the interrogatories.
8. When the jury returned with its verdict, the Clerk of
the Court had the following exchange with the jury foreperson:
THE CLERK:

Okay. What is the amount of
compensatory damages to which
Miss Jama is entitled on account of
her RFRA claim alone, without
considering damages on account of
any other claim on which you
found a defendant liable?
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THE FOREPERSON:
THE CLERK:

One dollar.

Was the amount—I’m sorry. Was
the amount of damages awarded on
the RFRA claim included in the
amount of damages awarded on any
other claim?

THE FOREPERSON:
THE CLERK:

No.

Okay. Is Miss Jama entitled to
punitive damages against any
defendant found liable on her
RFRA claim?

THE FOREPERSON:

No.

J.A. 232 (emphasis added).
9. The District Court awarded attorney’s fees holding
that 33% to 50% of the damages awarded were allocable to the
RFRA claim.
10. My colleagues in the majority correctly hold that the
District Court erred in its determination, and I agree with them.
Where I part company with my colleagues is their stark refusal
to recognize the jury’s explicit declaration, made after receiving
the District Court’s specific instructions, that the $1 awarded for
the RFRA claim was not included in the calculation of the
$100,000 awarded on the general state negligence claim. In
other words, the fee-eligible RFRA conduct punished by the $1
award was wholly apart from, and distinct from, the
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non-fee-eligible conduct punished by the award of $100,000 for
negligent conduct.
Thus, in this case, only the nominal damages may be
considered for purposes of fee-eligible attorney’s fees, and the
only reasonable attorney’s fee is no fee at all. Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103 (1992).
I would not remand to the District Court. Rather, I would
reverse outright and instruct the District Court to deny all
attorney’s fees as I believe no further consideration is required.
I.
The majority offers two theories under which it believes
the District Court could award fees. First, under Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the District Court could
determine that the state claim of negligent hiring, training,
supervision, and retention involved a “common core of facts” or
was based on a “related legal theory” such that the $100,000
award on that claim could enhance the overall “degree of
success” of the $1 award obtained on the RFRA claim. But the
jury’s verdict, expressed unequivocally and unambiguously in
the interrogatory answers and in the answers to the Court Clerk,
forecloses this argument by drawing an unmistakable line
between the two claims. Alternatively, the District Court might
apply Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Farrar and find that
factors other than the amount of damages make the RFRA
award, standing alone, more worthy than a “technical” or “de
minimis” victory. Again, however, this argument is completely
undercut by the fact that the jury explicitly set apart the conduct
ascribable to the RFRA claim, and determined that this conduct
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merited no damages other than the bare acknowledgment that a
violation occurred.
A.
An examination of the verdict form rules out the
possibility that the plaintiff’s success on the negligence claim
had any bearing on the nominal award on the RFRA claim.
Interrogatory number 2G asked specifically whether “the
amount of the damages awarded on the RFRA claim [was]
included in the amount of damages awarded on any other
claim.” J.A. 241. In response, the jury initially marked “Yes,”
scratched out that response, and then marked its final answer as
“No.” Id. This amended response clearly demonstrates that the
jury not only considered, but ultimately rejected, the notion that
the RFRA award and the negligence award shared any common
basis. All of the proscribed conduct is distinct from the general
negligence conduct. So too are the defendants who have been
found liable. Only two defendants have been found liable for
the RFRA conduct, whereas four defendants have been found
liable for the general negligence conduct, thereby emphasizing
the lack of legal and factual overlap between the RFRA and
negligence claims.
The underlying facts bear out this dichotomy. Indeed, the
majority itself notes that Jama presented “evidence of general
indignities suffered in the Facility,” on the one hand, and
“evidence specifically relating to restrictions on her practice of
religion,” on the other hand. Maj. op. 5. The majority then
enumerates the conduct that fell within the latter category,
including exposing Jama naked to common view, forcing her to
eat pork, disrupting her prayers, and defiling her copy of the
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Koran.
The majority does not, however, explain that the “general
indignities” were of an entirely different nature. Toilets were in
close proximity to sleeping areas and were clogged and
overflowing with human waste. Food supplies were insufficient
and often consisted of spoiled or rotten food. The tainted food
caused vomiting and diarrhea, which exacerbated the already
overwhelmed plumbing. Heating was inadequate in the winter
causing ice to collect on the cell walls, while prisoners were
deprived of warm clothing and sufficient blankets. Female
prisoners, like Jama, were given only one sanitary napkin per
month.
The guards themselves were physically and
psychologically abusive to the prisoners regardless of religion.
The only possible understanding of the jury’s answer to
interrogatory number 2G is that the jury segregated these general
indignities from the religious indignities, and then concluded
that one set (the general conduct) merited $100,000 in
compensatory damages while the other set (the RFRA conduct)
merited none. The jury explicitly disavowed any overlap in the
damages it awarded; accordingly, neither we nor the District
Court may alter that verdict by conferring the success obtained
on the negligence claim to the RFRA claim. By altering the
jury’s verdict, the District Court erred in assuming that the jury
ignored its instructions and acted improperly. It is an “almost
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their
instructions.” Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 585
(1994) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206
(1987)). Neither the District Court nor my colleagues in the
majority have the authority to alter the jury’s findings or to
construe the jury’s findings in a way that is inconsistent with the
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verdict.
The Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S.
Const. amend. VII.; see also Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d
1155 (3d Cir. 1989). My colleagues in the majority would
permit the District Court to substitute its judgment for the jury’s
verdict by circumventing the jury’s actual RFRA award and
adding to it a portion of the negligence award so that
fee-shifting may be achieved. The majority opinion, by
supplanting the jury’s verdict and factfinding with the District
Court’s factfinding, has thereby violated the proper roles of
judge and jury under the Constitution.
I believe the verdict form is definitively dispositive in
this case.
B.
All we are left with, then, is the $1 award standing alone,
irrespective of the $100,000 award. Viewed thus, this case
reveals itself to be an unexceptional civil rights case where the
plaintiff has prevailed but failed to prove any damages. In
Farrar, the Supreme Court announced the default rule that
“[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of
his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for
monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”
506 U.S. at 115 (citation omitted).
Subsequently, several courts of appeals have affirmed
that a nominal victory should receive a fee award only in the
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rare or unusual case. See Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 238
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]hile there is no per se rule that a plaintiff
recovering nominal damages can never get a fee award, Farrar
indicates that the award of fees in such a case will be rare.”);
Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 467 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting
Farrar as permitting fee awards only “in some rare cases”);
Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that the plaintiff had failed to distinguish his case “from the
‘usual’ case where a prevailing civil rights plaintiff is not
entitled to attorney’s fees when all that he has won is . . .
nominal damages”); Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 146 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating that “attorney’s fees are not appropriate simply
because plaintiff successfully establishes that his constitutional
rights have been violated”); Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550
(9th Cir. 1994) (“Farrar teaches that an award of nominal
damages is not enough” to support an award of fees without
some other tangible result.); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic,
___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 1636625, at *4 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“Plaintiffs in nominal-damage cases should not be awarded
attorney’s fees in any but exceptional circumstances.”).
The majority sets aside the controlling opinion in Farrar,
however, and turns instead to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
for the proposition that fee awards are occasionally permitted
despite an award of only nominal damages. But Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion—not joined by any other
member of the Court—is just that: it is her own explanation of
how she herself would like to hold. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 116
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion and
concur in its judgment. I write separately only to explain more
fully why, in my view, it is appropriate to deny fees in this
case.”). Five justices including Justice O’Connor joined the
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majority opinion in holding that a $1 nominal fee does not
usually entitle the plaintiff to § 1988(b) attorney’s fees. There
was no plurality for Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion to
join or to bolster, and therefore we do not look to it for the
“narrowest grounds” of a splintered decision. See Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented
court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”)
(emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see
also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693
(3d Cir. 1991) (“In a run-of-the-mill case where a majority of
the Justices endorse a single legal standard, lower courts simply
follow that standard.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, to the extent that Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence is attractive, it only elaborates that, in some cases,
a fee award might be justified by the presence of other factors,
such as a significant legal issue or the accomplishment of some
public goal, which elevate the nominal damages beyond a mere
“technical” or “de minimis” victory. Id. at 121-22 (O’Connor,
J., concurring). And, in some unusual cases, courts have indeed
cited these factors in affirming fee awards for nominal damages.
See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the case involved a question of first impression that
had broader implications for all women participating on
traditionally male school sports teams); Diaz-Rivera v.
Rivera-Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that
the plaintiffs’ victory in a political discrimination suit against
their municipality was a significant legal conclusion serving an
important public purpose).
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Nevertheless, an award of attorney’s fees remains
inappropriate in the ordinary civil rights case where the only
damages obtained were nominal. See Pino, 101 F.3d at 239
(“The vast majority of civil rights litigation does not result in
ground-breaking conclusions of law . . . .”); Maul, 23 F.3d at
146 (observing that all “Section 1983 claims necessarily involve
the violation of a right, privilege or immunity”).
Indeed, none of the indicated factors are present in this
case. Nothing in the record suggests that Jama’s victory on her
RFRA claim was anything but a technical and de minimis
victory. Even the District Court was unable to justify awarding
fees for Jama’s RFRA claim without borrowing substantially
from the general negligence claim. Without the ability to
conflate these two claims, however, the District Court would
only be left to conclude that no fee award is appropriate.
II.
Because I would hold that the District Court is entirely
precluded by the jury’s special interrogatories and verdict form
from augmenting the nominal damages on the RFRA claim with
the $100,000 damages on the general negligence claim, I would
hold that the District Court’s judgment must be reversed and
that the District Court must be instructed that no attorney’s fees
are to be allowed. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the
majority’s opinion, which remands to the District Court for
further consideration.
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